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NOTES
NO SUIT FOR YOU! IQBAL'S EFFECT ON
POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS CASES AND THE
"COMPOUND ALLEGATIONS" SOLUTION
Giovanni Angles*
INTRODucriON
Just follow the ordering procedure and you will be fine.... As you
walk in the place, move immediately to your right .... [K]eep the
line moving.... [H]old out your money, speak your soup in a loud
clear voice, step to the left and receive.... It's very important not to
embellish on your order. No extraneous comments. No questions.
No compliments.'
These were the instructions given to Jerry Seinfeld and his
friends, in order to buy their lunches from the infamous "Soup Nazi."
2
They subject themselves to these draconian rules because it is the best
tasting soup in the city. If the rules are violated, the offender is ban-
ished with the scathing admonishment: "No soup for you!"
3
Our civil pleading system is beginning to resemble the Soup
Nazi's lunch counter. A plaintiff must file her complaint with an
increasing amount of specific factual allegations in order to move on
to the pretrial discovery stage. Failing to adhere to these tougher stan-
dards will likely result in a granted motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. No suit for you.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Political
Science, Florida International University, 2007. Special thanks to Professor Jay
Tidmarsh for his invaluable assistance during the writing of this Note. Thank you to
the staff of Notre Dame Law Review for their editing suggestions and excellent
feedback. This Note is dedicated to my amazing wife Lisbet for her love and support.
1 Seinfeld: The Soup Nazi (NBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 1995).
2 Id.
3 Id.
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This Note attempts to analyze this "brave new world" of pleading
by applying the Ashcroft v. Iqbal4 standard to cases that passed muster
under the well-established Conley v. Gibson5 precedent. Part I covers
the history of notice pleading and highlights its intended role as a
simplified method of initiating litigation. Part II discusses the recent
changes wrought by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Iqbal in creating
a new two-pronged "plausibility" standard that also classifies complaint
elements as being either factual allegations or legal conclusions. Part
III analyzes the pleadings of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 7 Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,8 and Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,9 which were all sufficiently pleaded
under the Conley standard, finding that they likely would never make
it to discovery, post-Iqbal. Part IV proposes a potential solution for
plaintiffs, by recommending that they draft their complaints using
mostly "compound allegations" in order to inoculate their legal con-
clusions from Iqbars first prong filter.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NOTICE PLEADING
Notice pleading arose out of a long history that evolved from the
highly technical common-law pleading system inherited from
England, 10 and the subsequent code pleading system adopted in
about half of the states by the year 1900.11 Pleadings traditionally ful-
filled four major functions: (1) providing notice of the nature of a
claim or defense, (2) stating the facts each party believes to exist, (3)
narrowing the issues to be litigated, and (4) providing for the means
of speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.' 2 Ful-
filling all of these policy goals led to a cumbersome system where cases
4 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
5 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
7 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
8 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
9 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
10 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 12-17 (2d
ed. 1947).
11 See id. at 21-23; see also id. at 23-31 (detailing the spread and extent of code
pleading before the Federal Rules were adopted).
12 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587,
598 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 59-60 (1st ed. 1969)); see also CLARK, supra note
10, at 54 ("Under the common-law system the pleadings were expected to formulate
the issue to be tried. The original code ideal was that the pleadings should disclose
the material facts of the case.").
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were just as often decided on the basis of technicalities and pleading
defects as on their merits. 13
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure significantly
simplified the pleading requirements. Rule 8 states that a claim for
relief requires "a short and plain statement" of the grounds for juris-
diction, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief sought."14
After Rule 8 was in place, most of the traditional requirements of
pleading were delegated to other pretrial events. 15 With this change,
" [t] he relevant facts may be determined by discovery. The issues like-
wise may be narrowed by discovery . .. or by 'partial summary judg-
ment' under Rule 56(d). Moreover, cases in which there is no real
controversy may be disposed of speedily, finally, and on the merits, by
summary judgment."1 6 In 1947, Charles E. Clark, the principal
drafter of the Rules, defined the change as a simplified code pleading
system primarily designed to promote fact pleading, which placed a
"great emphasis" on stating the facts of the case.1 7 He identified
notice pleading as a relatively new perspective that had some support
among legal scholars for universal adoption. 8 Ten years later, the
Supreme Court embraced the concept of notice pleading in Conley v.
Gibson.19
J.D. Conley worked in the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Com-
pany where, as a condition of employment, he was required to join a
labor union known as the Brotherhood. 20 Because he was black, he
was barred from joining the all-white lodge, Local 28, and instead was
13 See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1202, at 88 (3d ed. 2004) ("Since the pleadings were expected to perform so
many duties, it was natural that strict rules should develop as to them, which in turn
meant that many cases were disposed of on pleading defects without regard to the
merits of the controversy."); see also CLARK, supra note 10, at 31 ("Until 1938, federal
procedure was one of the most difficult in the country, requiring the skill of trained
specialists for the application of its esoteric principles."); FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE FoRMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 1-7 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whita-
ker eds., 1936) (describing the various forms of action where a plaintiff's injury
needed to be "pigeon-holed" and the common procedural pitfalls that led to prema-
ture dismissals).
14 FED. R. Cry. P. 8(a).
15 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 1202, at 89.
16 Id.
17 See CLARx, supra note 10, at 56.
18 See id.
19 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
20 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Conley, 355 U.S. 41 (No. 7).
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"forced to maintain membership in Local 6051."21 The two local
union lodges were racially segregated but otherwise presumably
equal.22 On May 1, 1954, the railroad company eliminated forty-five
paid positions, all of them belonging to Local 6051 members.23
Advance warning was not provided as required by the union agree-
ment, and none of the white employees from Local 28 lost their
jobs.24 The few black workers that did get rehired lost their seniority
and were considered junior to their newly hired white coworkers.25
Conley (and his coplaintiffs) sued the Brotherhood for commit-
ting "a planned course of conduct designed to discriminate against
petitioners and those similarly situated, solely because of their race or
color."26 The complaint also alleged that the Brotherhood "had failed
in general to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith." 27
After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant
the defendant's motion to dismiss (on jurisdictional grounds), the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment and allowed Conley's case to
proceed.28 On the issue as to whether Conley's plea was sufficient, the
Court unanimously held that it was adequate, explaining that a case
cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."29 By establishing the "no
set of facts" standard, the Court interpreted Rule 8 (a) to demand only
notice pleading. This interpretation usurped Clark's original idea
that the Federal Rules merely established a simplified code pleading
system. Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Conley standard time and again30 until the one-two punch of Twombly
21 Id.
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Con/ey, 355 U.S. at 43 (1957).
28 Id. at 43-44.
29 Id. at 45-46.
30 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002) (holding
that an employment discrimination complaint does not "require a plaintiff to plead
facts establishing a prima facie case" since that is "an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement"); id. at 511 ("When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a
complaint..., [t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))). Akos Swierkiewicz made several particularized
allegations in his complaint, which provided sufficient notice to Sorema and the court
of his racial and age discrimination claims. See infra Part III; see also, e.g., Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68
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and Iqbal dramatically changed the rules governing the sufficiency of
pleadings.3 1
II. TWOMBLY AND IQBAL RAISE THE BAR
A. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
William Twombly was not the first person to complain about his
high monthly bills for home telephone service and Internet access. As
a former customer service representative for a Twombly defendant, the
author of this Note personally received calls from thousands of cus-
tomers just like Twombly that wanted to air their grievances. What
those customers did not tend to do, however, was file nationwide class
action antitrust lawsuits.
The days of each Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC)
being the exclusive provider of phone service in a given area ended
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996.32 In exchange for the
anticipated increase in competition for local telephone service, the
ILECs were allowed the opportunity to sell long-distance service. 33
The deregulation of local telephone markets did not result in
increased competition for two reasons: first, upstart competitors were
unable to meaningfully compete against the ILECs, and second, the
ILECs themselves did not venture into each other's territorial
strongholds. 34 Twombly's claim was that the ILEC Baby Bells had con-
spired to "engag[e] in parallel conduct" by stifling competition and
"refrain [ing] from competing against one another," in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.35
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision to
reverse the district court's dismissal of the case for failure to state a
(1993) (holding that a plaintiff's § 1983 complaint cannot be held to a heightened
pleading standard because all civil claims must conform to Rule 8(a)'s notice stan-
dard, except for claims of "averments of fraud or mistake" which must be pleaded
with particularity in accordance with Rule 9(b)). The specific Leatherman allegations
and the defendant's motion to dismiss arguments are discussed in greater detail in
Part III.
31 But see Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. Riv. 873, 891-910 (2009) (arguing that Twombly is generally consis-
tent with the text and history of Rule 8(a) (2)).
32 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
33 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)).
34 Id. at 565.
35 See id. at 550-51 (describing the particular activities that were labeled "parallel
conduct" against upstart competitors and the limited evidence of refusal to compete).
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claim.3 6 The Court held that, while it was technically possible that the
defendants' actions resulted from an illegal conspiracy, the plaintiff
failed to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face."37 The claims did not cross "the line from conceivable to
plausible" because the alleged activities were legal, so long as there
was no actual agreement among the defendants.3 8 Also, the defend-
ants' behavior was perfectly rational in the absence of a conspiracy,
considering the peculiar nature of the telecommunications industry.39
The Court insisted that Twombly does not create a heightened
pleading standard nor does it collapse into the specified pleading
requirements of Rule 9 claims of fraud and mistake. 40 By requiring
that pleadings contain enough allegations to fulfill a "plausibility stan-
dard," Twombly departs from the idea of traditional notice pleading by
allowing courts to dismiss "implausible" cases before discovery opens
the door to skyrocketing legal expenses. 41 The possibility that the
plausibility requirement was limited to antitrust cases 42 was dispelled
by the following case, where the Court signaled its intent to eliminate
pure notice pleading for all civil cases.
B. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Before I go to prison, the America that I know is a beautiful country
and Americans are such beautiful, kind, humble people. When I go
to prison, I see there a different face of the United States of
America.
Javaid Iqba14 3
Javaid Iqbal found himself in the oft-clich6d "wrong place at the
wrong time." He lived in Long Island as a cable repair technician for
36 Id. at 566, 569-70.
37 Id. at 570; see also id. at 548-49 (requiring a complaint to include "some factual
context suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action").
38 Id. at 566-70.
39 See id. at 566-69; see also id. at 568-69 (stating that the complaint itself contains
factual allegations that argue against the plausibility of a conspiracy).
40 Id. at 569 n.14.
41 See id. at 559 (describing the practical benefits of weeding out meritless claims
at the pleading stage, instead of depending on the ineffectiveness of "careful case
management").
42 See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 121-22 (2007), http://www.law.north
western.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/31 (arguing that courts were mistakenly
applying Twombly outside of antitrust law).
43 Nina Bernstein, 2 Men Charge Abuse in Arrests After 9/11 TerrorAttack, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 3, 2004, at B1.
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ten years before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 44 He was
arrested in his apartment less than two months later.45 Federal agents
(on an unrelated investigation) entered his apartment and found a
Time magazine with the burning Twin Towers on the cover. 46 They
also found paperwork showing that he was in Lower Manhattan pick-
ing up a work permit that September morning.47 Iqbal was one of 184
detained individuals classified as "of high interest" in the Department
of Justice's (DOJ) September 11 investigation. 4 While housed in the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU), he
was among the detainees "kept in lockdown 23 hours a day, spending
the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons
accompanied by a four-officer escort. '49 After nine months of incar-
ceration, he was cleared of any links to terrorism by the FBI, but not
before he allegedly suffered multiple episodes of physical and emo-
tional abuse.50 After he pled guilty to having false papers and
checks-an agreement to expedite his release from ADMAX SHU-
Iqbal served a prison term and was later deported to his native
Pakistan.51
Iqbal filed suit in the Eastern District of New York, not to contest
his arrest, but his treatment while incarcerated in the ADMAX SHU.52
Iqbal's suit named thirty-four federal officials and nineteen unnamed
federal corrections officers, based on an implied cause of action for
the government's alleged Fourth Amendment violations.53 Aside
from suing for the abusive acts themselves,54 Iqbal also filed a discrimi-
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1943-44.
51 Id. at 1943; Bernstein, supra note 43.
52 Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1943. Iqbal's lawsuit was combined along with another
plaintiff, Ehab Elmaghraby, who was similarly detained in the ADMAX SHU during
the DOJ's post-9/11 investigation sweeps. Mr. Elmaghraby later settled his case for
$300,000 and Iqbal became the lead plaintiff. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d
Cir. 2007), revd sub nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; see also Nina Bernstein, U.S. Is Settling
Detainee's Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at Al (reporting on the case
details and the settlement amount).
53 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-97 (1971).
54 Iqbal claimed he was "deliberately and cruelly subjected to numerous instances
of excessive force and verbal abuse, unlawful strip and body cavity-searches, the denial
of medical treatment, the denial of adequate nutrition, extended detention in solitary
confinement, the denial of adequate exercise, and deliberate interference with [his]
2011]
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nation claim against the federal officials because he believed he
"[was] singled out for such mistreatment because of [his] race,
national origin, and religion" and the defendants were liable for "cre-
ating, participating in, and endorsing Plaintiff ['s] systematic mistreat-
ment. ' 55 Among the federal officials sued were John Ashcroft, former
U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI. 56
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), based
on qualified immunity grounds and failure to state a claim for supervi-
sory liability.5 7 The district court rejected the motion since Iqbal's
complaint gave the defendants sufficient notice. 58 The court did
acknowledge Ashcroft and Mueller's potentially valid qualified immu-
nity, so it allowed them to file for summary judgment if Iqbal's initial
discovery did not yield a sufficient claim for liability. 59
On appeal to the Second Circuit, not only was the lower court's
ruling on the sufficiency of the pleading affirmed, but it was done so
under the more rigorous Twombly plausibility standard since that case
was decided before Iqba's Second Circuit ruling. 60 The qualified
immunity issue also gave the Second Circuit some cause for concern,
but they supported the idea of allowing Iqbal access to some limited
discovery.61
rights to counsel and to exercise" his religious beliefs. First Amended Complaint &
Jury Demand at 3, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 (JG) (JA), 2005 WL
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
55 Id.
56 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
57 Id. at 1944.
58 Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10. The district court's ruling predates
Twombly, so it naturally applied the notice pleading standard commonly used at the
time, without applying a plausibility standard.
59 Id. at *21 ("The issue of qualified immunity should be addressed at the earliest
appropriate stage. Where, as here, there are factual disputes that bear on the availa-
bility of the defense, discovery may be structured accordingly." (citing Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599-600 (1998))). Discovery was limited to whether each
defendant was involved "in the creation and implementation of the policy or policies
under which plaintiffs were detained, whether he or she had knowledge of the condi-
tions under which plaintiffs were detained, and the defendant's involvement in or
knowledge of the clearance process and the alleged bypassing of [Bureau of Prisons]
procedures." Id.
60 lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 166, 178 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
61 Id. at 158 ("[A] district court might wish to structure such limited discovery by
examining written responses to interrogatories and requests to admit before authoriz-
ing depositions, and by deferring discovery directed to high-level officials until discov-
ery of front-line officials has been completed and has demonstrated the need for
[additional discovery].").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision, and remanded.62 In short, Iqbal's complaint was not
adequate to survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The Court first established that the defendants' quali-
fied immunity from their subordinates' actions raised Iqbal's burden
of proof by requiring him to allege sufficient facts to show discrimina-
tory purpose. 63 Facts alleging mere knowledge of the discriminatory
actions would not be good enough.
The Court then focused its attention on Iqbal's complaint, where
it characterized its Twombly pleading analysis as a "two-pronged
approach." 64 While a complaint's allegations must be accepted as true
when subjected to a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, a court does not have to
accept those allegations it considers to be "legal conclusions." 65 Thus,
a complaint's allegations must be classified as either an acceptable fac-
tual allegation, or a legal conclusion which the Court described as
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements."66 After disregarding the legal con-
clusions, the remaining factual allegations should then be scrutinized
to "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief."67
The Court explained the mechanics of the two-pronged
approach by using the Twombly pleadings as an example. The allega-
tion that the defendant phone companies "ha[d] entered into a con-
tract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry... and
ha[d] agreed not to compete with one another" was dismissed as a
legal conclusion, since it "flatly" pleaded the legal requirements under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 68 This left the Court with the factual
allegation that the defendants' "'parallel course of conduct . . . to
prevent competition' and inflate prices was indicative of the unlawful
62 Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
63 Id. at 1948-49 ("Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention
of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must
plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatoiy purpose." (emphasis
added) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 540-41 (1993))). Because of this, Iqbal had to sufficiently plead facts that the
defendants "adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neu-
tral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race,
religion, or national origin." Id. at 1949.
64 Id. at 1950.
65 Id. at 1949-50.
66 Id. at 1949.
67 Id. at 1950.
68 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
551 (2007)).
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agreement alleged." 69 The Court concluded that because the allega-
tion "did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it was not only
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful,
unchoreographed free-market behavior," the implausibility of an
unlawful agreement was reason enough to sustain the phone compa-
nies' 12(b)(6) motion.70
The Court proceeded to apply the two-pronged approach to
Iqbal's complaint, to determine whether the claim against Ashcroft
and Mueller plausibly showed discriminatory purpose. The complaint
included allegations that the two defendants each "knew of, con-
doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal]" to abu-
sive confinement within the ADMAX SHU, doing so "as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national ori-
gin and for no legitimate penological interest."71 Iqbal also alleged
that Ashcroft, in his position as the federal government's chief law
enforcement officer, was the "'principal architect'" of the policy,
while Mueller was "instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and
implementation" of the discriminatory policies.72 Starting with the
first prong, the Court decided that these allegations are "conclusory
and not entitled to be assumed true," because they merely state "bare
assertions" of the minimum requirements for a constitutional discrim-
ination claim. 73
For the second prong of analysis, the Court reviewed the remain-
ing allegations deemed to be "factual," specifically that "the [FBI],
under the direction of [Mueller] arrested and detained thousands of
Arab Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of Sep-
tember 11."' 74 It also considered the allegation that the policy to hold
the detainees in "highly restrictive conditions of confinement" was
approved by both Ashcroft and Mueller.75 The Court held that while
the above allegations were consistent with the plaintiff's claim of pur-
poseful discrimination, the existence of "'obvious alternative explana-
tions"' meant that imputing the defendants with purposeful
69 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1951 (alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint &Jury
Demand, supra note 54, at 17-18).
72 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint &Jury Demand,
supra note 54, at 4-5).
73 Id.
74 Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint
&Jury Demand, supra note 54, at 10).
75 Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 54, at
13-14).
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discrimination "is not a plausible conclusion."76 The majority opinion
went on to reject the lower court's order to allow staged discovery in
lieu of dismissing the claim.7 7
Justice Souter's dissent rejects the two-prong approach. Despite
Twombly's plausibility requirement, each allegation must be taken as
true when subject to a 12(b) (6) motion.78 The allegations in a com-
plaint should be judged as a collective whole, and not in isolation.79
Also, attempting to filter out legal conclusions leads to inconsistent
results since the line separating legal conclusions from substantive fac-
tual allegations is not always clear.8 0
III. APPLYING IQBAL TO MERITORIOUS CONLEY-ERA PLEADINGS
Iqba's significance was readily apparent soon after the decision
was announced in May 2009. The Iqbal Court insists that it merely
reaffirms the plausibility standard established in Twombly.8s Neverthe-
less, the early consensus is that Iqbals two-prong approach sets the
pleading bar even higher.8 2 The danger is that increasing judicial effi-
ciency by enforcing a stricter pleading standard could result in the
premature dismissal of "ugly duckling" claims that are relatively weak
in the initial pleadings, but ultimately turn out to be meritorious.
76 Id. at 1951-52 (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
The alternative explanation was that since the September 11 attacks were perpetrated
by nineteen Arab Muslims from the Middle East, an otherwise lawful investigation can
plausibly have a disparate impact against Arab Muslims in the United States. Id.
77 Id. at 1953. But see id. at 1961-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of
granting discretion to the lower courts to direct limited discovery).
78 Id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The sole exception to this rule lies with
allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about
little green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.
That is not what we have here.").
79 Id. at 1960.
80 Id. at 1960-61.
81 Id. at 1953 (majority opinion).
82 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 852, 867-83 (2010) (distinguishing
Twombly's "thin screening model" from Iqbars "thick screening model" and conclud-
ing that the latter method potentially screens out meritorious suits); Adam Liptak,
Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009,
at A10 (reporting that "things started to change" after Twombly, but "[iun the new
world, after Iqbal, a lawsuit has to satisfy a skeptical judicial gatekeeper"); Editorial,
Throwing Out Mr. Iqbal's Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A28 ("The court's conserva-
tive majority is increasingly using legal technicalities to keep people from getting a
fair hearing.... When people with legitimate claims cannot get a hearing, the whole
system of American justice is diminished.").
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This Note will now delve into the inexact science of analyzing the
pleadings of selected Conley-era complaints to determine their suffi-
ciency under Iqbals two-prong approach. Before doing so, there are
two caveats to keep in mind. First, because this analysis compares two
sets of standards (as opposed to bright-line rules), there is inevitably a
degree of uncertainty in deciding whether a complaint will satisfy
Iqbars standard. Conley's "no set of facts" method at least considered a
complaint's allegations as a whole. An early criticism of Iqbals
approach is that the results can vary widely, depending on which alle-
gations a judge chooses to weed out in the first prong.8 3 That said,
one can extend the Court's own definitions and analogies to reasona-
bly predict the sufficiency of a pleading under IqbaL
Second, this analysis presupposes that the complaints drafted by
the plaintiffs were as "well-pleaded" as possible when the lawsuits were
filed. There is the possibility that attorneys filed complaints in the
Conley era with fewer pleaded facts than they had at their disposal. In
a notice pleading regime, with less worries of being susceptible to a
12(b) (6) motion, a plaintiff may have had legitimate reasons not to
plead the full extent of facts at her disposal. That said, it is generally
accepted that the opposite is true: attorneys typically overplead their
cases for tactical reasons.8 4
This will not be a large-scale empirical statistical analysis. Instead,
I will analyze the pleadings of two Supreme Court cases that promi-
nently reaffirmed Conley in recent years.8 5 I have also included the
pleadings of a well-reported gender discrimination case that ulti-
mately led to a Supreme Court ruling against the plaintiff, on unre-
83 See Bone, supra note 82, at 867-70 (explaining how a legal conclusion should
be defined and the potential for district judges to overapply the first prong to make
their decisionmaking easier).
84 See, e.g., Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1986)
("The idea of 'a plain and short statement of the claim' has not caught on. Few
complaints follow the models in the Appendix of Forms. Plaintiffs' lawyers, knowing
that some judges read a complaint as soon as it is filed in order to get a sense of the
suit, hope by pleading facts to 'educate' (that is to say, influence) the judge with
regard to the nature and probable merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage
for an advantageous settlement by showing the defendant what a powerful case they
intend to prove."); see also Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A
Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1840 (2008) (reasoning that the tradition to overplead may be
"masking Twombly's true effect" of strengthening 12(b)(6) motions).
85 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
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lated grounds. 86 Despite her loss, the issues brought to light by the
Court's holding eventually led to a legislative response to abrogate
that decision. 87
A. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
1. The Allegations
Fifty-year-old Akos Swierkiewicz was fired from his job.88 He
worked for eight years at Sorema N.A., a New York-based reinsurance
company owned by a French parent corporation.8 9 He was initially
hired as a Senior Vice President and Chief Underwriting Officer
(CUO).90 Mr. Swierkiewicz filed a lawsuit, alleging that he was termi-
nated on the basis of his Hungarian ethnicity in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196491 and on the basis of his age in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.92
Swierkiewicz submitted a nine-page amended complaint with the
following list of detailed allegations, including the introductory facts
listed above: In all respects, Swierkiewicz "performed his job in a satis-
factory and exemplary manner. '93 In February 1995, Francois Chavel,
a French national and Sorema's Chief Executive Officer, demoted Mr.
Swierkiewicz and transferred the bulk of his CUO duties to another
French national, Nicholas Papadopoulo. 94 Mr. Papadopoulo was
thirty-two years old at the time, sixteen years younger and far less
experienced than Mr. Swierkiewicz. 95 When he made the decision,
Mr. Chavel told Mr. Swierkiewicz he took the action to "energize" the
underwriting department, clearly implying he felt Mr. Swierkiewicz
was too old for the job.9 6
86 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). The plaintiff
lost her case not because of her pleadings, but on statute of limitations grounds. See
id. at 637-43.
87 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
88 Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506 (No. 00-1853), 2001 WL
1488046, at *7.
89 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.
90 Id.
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
92 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
93 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 88, at 5, 2001 WL 1488046, at *5 (citing
Joint Appendix at 25a, 18, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506 (No. 00-1853)).
94 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 1 19).
95 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 19, 22).
96 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 1 22-23).
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A year later, Mr. Chavel formally appointed Mr. Papadopoulo to
the CUO position. 97 Mr. Swierkiewicz was relegated to a marketing
and services position.98 Meanwhile, much younger and less qualified
employees were hired and promoted by Sorema to jobs that
Swierkiewicz was clearly qualified to perform.99 For example, Michel
Gouze, another French national, was hired as Sorema's Vice President
in charge of Marketing, but he had virtually no experience in the
insurance or reinsurance business. He had to rely on Mr.
Swierkiewicz to perform his duties. 100 Another employee, Daniel
Peed, who was much younger than Mr. Swierkiewicz and who had pre-
viously reported to him, was promoted to the position of Senior Vice
President of Risk Property. 10 1 Allegedly, these decisions had nothing
to do with Mr. Swierkiewicz's performance; he was demoted on
account of his national origin and age. 102
Over the course of the next two years, Mr. Chavel continued to
discriminate against Mr. Swierkiewicz on account of his national ori-
gin and age. 10 3 He did so by isolating him, excluding him from busi-
ness decisions and meetings, and denying him any opportunity for
career growth at Sorema.104 Mr. Swierkiewicz tried to meet with Mr.
Chavel to resolve the unsatisfactory working conditions to which he
was subject, but his efforts were unavailing.10 5 Finally, on April 14,
1997, after two years of ongoing discrimination, Mr. Swierkiewicz sent
Mr. Chavel a memo outlining his grievances and requesting a sever-
ance package from Sorema.10 6 Mr. Chavel did not respond to the
memo.107 Fifteen days later, on April 29, 1997, Mr. Chavel and
Sorema's general counsel met with Mr. Swierkiewicz and gave him an
ultimatum: either resign without a severance package or be fired.108
Mr. Swierkiewicz refused to resign, whereupon Mr. Chavel fired him
97 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 21).
98 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 19).
99 Id. at 5-6, 2001 WL 1488046, at *5-6 (citingJoint Appendix, supra note 93, at
25a-26a, 7 24-27).
100 Id. at 6, 2001 WL 1488046, at *6 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 26a,
17 26-28).
101 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supa note 93, at 26a, 7 24-25).
102 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 25a, 20).
103 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 26a, 7 29-31).
104 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 26a, 29).
105 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 26a, 30).
106 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 26a, 31).
107 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 27a, 32).
108 Id. at 6-7, 2001 WL 1488046, at *6-7 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at
27a, 7 33).
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effective that very day. 109 There was no valid basis for the termination;
rather, it was motivated by Mr. Swierkiewicz's national origin and
age.110 Moreover, unlike other Sorema executives who were fired for
cause and who nonetheless received generous severance packages
from the company, Mr. Swierkiewicz-who was not fired for cause-
was denied severance pay and benefits by Sorema. 111
2. Applying the Iqbal Two-Prong Approach
As explained above, the first step in an Iqbal analysis is to filter
out all allegations classified as legal conclusions since they are "not
entitled to the presumption of truth."1 12 "Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory state-
ments, do not suffice."' 13 Once those conclusions are disregarded,
the remaining "well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation [s]" are
addressed to determine whether the plaintiff is plausibly entided to
relief. 114
The Swierkiewicz complaint includes several individual allegations
that would likely be filtered out as "legal conclusions." Any and all
allegations that describe the defendant executives' purpose or motive
as discriminatory are potential red flags for courts looking for "thread-
bare recitals of the elements." This includes the allegation in para-
graph twenty that Mr. Swierkiewicz was passed up for promotions on
account of his national origin and age; the allegation in paragraph
thirty-one that Mr. Chavel discriminated against Mr. Swierkiewicz for
two years on account of his national origin and age, and the allega-
tions in paragraph thirty-seven that his termination was motivated by
his national origin and age. 115
Even the allegation in paragraph twenty-three (Mr. Chavel
explaining his desire to "energize" the department) arguably gets
close to the "legal conclusion" borderline, if the language clearly
implying that plaintiff was too old for the job is viewed by ajudge as "a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."1 16 The allegation
109 Id. at 7, 2001 WL 1488046, at *7 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 27a,
1 34-35).
110 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 27a, 1 36-37).
111 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 27a, 1 38). Five former executives
were named in the allegation. Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 27a, 1 38.
112 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
113 Id. at 1949.
114 Id. at 1950-51.
115 See supra notes 102, 110 and accompanying text.
116 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)).
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does contain several elements of factual content, such as the loss of
the plaintiff's job title and the executive's stated reason for the
change. But, it also alleges the "clear implication" that the decision
was made for age-specific reasons, which may strike a court as an
impermissible legal conclusion."17
The remaining allegations would then be judged on their plausi-
bility. Here, Mr. Swierkiewicz benefits by alleging several individual
episodes of conduct that may suggest discrimination. These include
the allegations of the demotion, lost opportunities of advancement to
younger employees with considerably less experience, and the lack of
a severance package that other ex-executives enjoyed. While the
remaining pleadings are consistent with Swierkiewicz's discrimination
claim, Twombly and Iqbal are perfectly clear that consistency is not
enough, if a more likely explanation exists. 118
While it is possible that the remaining pleadings are convincing
enough to pass lqbals plausibility prong, a judge may choose to con-
clude that it is more likely that Swierkiewicz was simply a bad
employee. It may find that the more likely alternative is that his
unfortunate career at Sorema was due to lack of merit as opposed to
outright discrimination. This would particularly apply to the Title VII
claim, since there was no factual allegation supporting racial discrimi-
nation. The fact that Swierkiewicz is Hungarian, and the other execu-
tives were French does not automatically suggest discriminatory
behavior. At least the "energize" comment is a fact that can be con-
strued to refer to Swierkiewicz's age. Discrimination on the basis of
being Hungarian is merely conceivable, and on that basis, it would not
survive a 12(b) (6) motion. The ADEA claim seems stronger, but the
entire claim likely turns on whether the "energize" allegation makes it
to the second prong of analysis. Confirming this apparent uncer-
117 This example illustrates an issue unaddressed by IqbaL See infra Part IV.
118 See Iqba4 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567.
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tainty, federal courts have already disagreed'1 9 as to whether
Swierkiewicz's pleadings are sufficient in light of IqbaL. 20
B. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit
1. The Allegations
Charlene Leatherman and her son, Travis Leatherman were
stopped in the 8200 block of Cahoba Road in Fort Worth, Tarrant
County, Texas, by law enforcement officers in a marked police car.
Immediately after Charlene brought her vehicle to a stop, she was
surrounded by several men, later discovered to be plain clothes
police officers, who were armed with hand guns and other weapons.
The plain clothes officers shouted a variety of instructions to
Charlene and Travis and threatened to shoot each of them. The
plain clothes officers proceeded to identify Charlene and Travis,
and... informed them that law enforcement officers executing a
warrant had shot to death two dogs belonging to the Leathermans
[while searching] the Leatherman residence.' 21
119 See Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong.
17 nn.27-28 (2009) (statement of Arthur R. Miller, University Professor, New York
University School of Law). Compare Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ.
8909(LAP), 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) ("Iqbal was not meant
to displace Swierkiewicz's teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimi-
nation claims because in Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court
explicitly affirmed the vitality of Swierkiewicz,"), with Guirguis v. Movers Specialty
Servs., Inc., No. 09-1104, 2009 WL 3041992, at *2 n.7 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2009) ("We
have re-assessed Swierkiewicz in the wake of Twombly, Iqbal, and Phillips and have con-
cluded that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and
Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and
relies on Conley." (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009))), and Argeropoulos v. Exide Techs., No. 08-CV-3760 (S), 2009 WL 2132443, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) ("[T] his kind of non-specific allegation might have enabled
Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim to survive under the old 'no set of facts'
standard for assessing motions to dismiss. But it does not survive the Supreme Court's
'plausibility standard,' as most recently clarified in IqbaL" (citation omitted)).
120 After his case was remanded to the Southern District of New York, Akos
Swierkiewicz settled his case with Sorema for an undisclosed sum. After suing his
former employer, the backlash prevented him from working at another insurance
firm, despite his years of experience. He currently manages his own insurance con-
sulting company, and has served as an expert witness in over eighty civil actions. Tele-
phone Interview with Akos Swierkiewicz, Founder, IRCOS, LLC (Nov. 30, 2009).
121 See Brief for Petitioners at 3-8, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (No. 91-1657), 1992 WL 511939, at
*3--8.
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When Charlene asked why the family dogs had been shot, the officer
replied that this was "standard procedure."'122 "The search of the
Leatherman's home was planned and carried out by law enforcement
officers employed by or under the control of Tarrant County Narcot-
ics Intelligence and Coordination Unit (TCNICU), Tarrant County,
and the city of Lake Worth."' 23
After returning to their residence, Charlene and Travis
Leatherman discovered "Shakespeare," the smaller of the two family
dogs owned by the Leathermans, lying dead approximately twenty-five
feet from the main doorway entrance to their home. 124 Shakespeare
appeared to have been shot three times: once in the stomach, once in
the leg, and once in the head. "Ninja," the larger of the two dogs
owned by the Leathermans, was discovered on top of a bed located in
a rear bedroom of the house. Ninja had been shot in the head at
close range, apparently with a shotgun.12 5
Upon the conclusion of the search, after having discovered no
items described in the warrant that could otherwise have provided a
basis for a criminal prosecution, the officers verbally acknowledged to
Charlene and Travis their mistake in having searched the Leatherman
residence. 126 Instead of leaving at this time however, the officers
removed lawn chairs from a truck and lounged about the driveway
and yard of the Leatherman residence for approximately one and a
half hours. 127 The officers were drinking beer, smoking, talking, and
laughing. 128
After Mrs. Leatherman filed her complaint, her case was joined
with that of another plaintiff who had allegedly suffered similar mis-
treatment by Tarrant County law enforcement. 29 Four months ear-
lier, Gerald Andert was in his home when the front door was forced
open by Tarrant County officers.' 30 Mr. Andert was knocked back-
wards and clubbed twice on the head by an officer without provoca-
tion, causing a severe cut to Gerald's forehead that would later
require eleven stitches.' 31
122 Id. at 6, 1992 WL 511939, at *6.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 6-7, 1992 WL 511939, at *6-7.
125 Id. at 7, 1992 WL 511939, at *7.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 7-8, 1992 WL 511939, at *7-8.
129 See id. at 4-5, 1992 WL 511939, at *4-5.
130 Id. at 4, 1992 WL 511939, at *4.
131 Id. at 4-5, 1992 WL 511939, at *4-5.
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Gerald Andert and members of his family were required to lie
face down on the floor at gunpoint.132 Several requests for identifica-
tion were made of the officers present. The officers responded by
shouting obscenities and threats at the family members. The search
of the Andert residence lasted about one and a half hours. No illegal
items were discovered, and the officers left the premises without fur-
ther explanation. 3 3
As cited in the Respondents' Brief, each plaintiff further alleged:
[Defendants] failed to formulate and implement an adequate policy to
train [their] officers on the Constitutional limitations restricting the
manner in which search warrants may be executed; and that in the
light of the duties commonly assigned to officers who execute
search warrants, the need for additional or different training was so
obvious that the conduct of [Defendants], by and through [their]
official policy maker[s] [Defendants Curry and Carpenter], demon-
strates a deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of per-
sons likely to be affected by such failure to train.13 4
Both families' claims were eventually joined into a single case,
claiming that the searches were unconstitutional in violation of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the local gov-
ernment entities were liable under § 1983.135
2. Applying the Iqbal Two-Prong Approach
Just as with Swierkiewicz, the complaints in Leatherman definitely
would not survive Iqbats first prong unscathed. Municipalities are not
immune from § 1983 claims, but they "cannot be held liable unless a
municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.1 36 In
their appellate brief, the defendants (all of them municipal entities)
pointed out that all of the plaintiffs' allegations were conclusory in
132 Id. at 5, 1992 WL 511939, at *5.
133 Id.
134 Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163 (No. 91-1657), 1992 WL
511945, at *4-5 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citing Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint 11 26-27, 31-33, Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163 (No. 91-1657)).
Leatherman made an additional, similarly worded allegation with regards to a failed
policy to train as to the proper response "when confronted by family dogs." Id. at 4,
1992 WL 511945, at *4.
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The municipal defendants were Tarrant County,
the Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit (TCNICU), the
director of TCNICU and the sheriff (in their official capacities), and the cities of Lake
Worth and Grapevine, Texas. Brief for Respondents, supra note 134, at 3-4, 1992 WL
511945, at *3-4.
136 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.
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nature, without factual support.13 7 This argument did not mean very
much in a Conley pleading system that was primarily concerned with
providing notice.
In a post-Iqbal court, however, this argument is much more pow-
erful. Because attaching secondary liability to municipalities requires
a "policy or custom" that causes the injury, any such allegation made
without additional facts would probably classify as a "bare assertion" to
be filtered by Iqba's first prong. This includes the allegation stating
that the "[p]laintiffs have reason to believe" that the officers "were
acting in accordance with official policy usage and custom of the
[defendants]. "138 The first prong would likely also filter both allega-
tions claiming that the actions were caused by a failure to "formulate
and implement an adequate policy. '1 39 Those allegations depend on
an attenuated connection that conclusively links the officers' abusive
behavior with an omission that results in liability to the municipalities.
It is unlikely that a court applying Iqbal would have any allega-
tions left to consider for the second prong of analysis. That said, any
surviving allegations would be considered for their plausibility, and
courts would likely rule that the allegations make the claim merely
conceivable. Because the remaining allegations speak only of the
actions of the officers, there are a wealth of alternative explanations as
to why the municipalities are not liable. The officers may have acted
in violation of municipal regulations, or the officers' actions were
unfortunate, but appropriate given the circumstances. Without a fac-
tual allegation to nudge the claim from conceivable to plausible, 140
the Leatherman claim today would easily be dismissed on a 12(b) (6)
motion.
C. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Unlike the previous two cases, the Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari in Ledbetter to settle a question on its pleadings. After win-
137 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 134, at 5, 1992 WL 511945, at *5; see also,
e.g., supra note 134 and accompanying text (detailing the petitioners' complaints).
138 See id. at 3, 1992 WL 511945, at *3 (quoting Joint Appendix at 6-7, Leatherman,
507 U.S. 163 (No. 91-1657)).
139 Id. at 4-5, 1992 WL 511945, at *4-5 (citing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
supra note 134, 1 26-27, 31-33).
140 An example of this would be a specific allegation that a municipality trains its
officers to act in violation of a constitutional right. To pass muster, this allegation
should identify facts to make the allegation plausible (e.g., the existence of an inter-
nal memo or testimonials). The actual production of evidence is not necessary, since
that task can be relegated to pretrial discovery. At the pleading stage, the least that is
needed is a good-faith acknowledgement that plausible facts exist.
[VOL. 86"2
NO SUIT FOR YOU!
ning a verdict in district court,14 1 the judgment was vacated in the
Eleventh Circuit. The plaintiff lost on a statute of limitations issue
that generated significant media criticism 14 2 and ultimately led to a
legislative act that abrogated the Court's decision.
1 43
1. The Allegations
Lilly Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear from February 5, 1979
until October 31, 1998, when Goodyear "forced her into early retire-
ment. "'44 She worked as an Area Manager in the Tire Room at the
Gadsden Goodyear plant, and was the only female manager out of
sixteen managers.' 45 As an Area Manager, Ledbetter was similarly sit-
uated with her male co-workers and was doing equal work in the same
establishment. 146 However, Ledbetter's male coworkers who were
doing identical work were paid at a higher rate. 147 In the fall of 1997,
she objected to the company's discriminatory pay practice by com-
plaining to her supervisor, Jerry Jones. 48 She informed him that she
was being paid unfairly compared to her male co-workers performing
similarly in equal positions.149 Shortly thereafter, Jones instructed Ms.
Ledbetter that it was in her own best interest to interview for and
accept the position of Technical Engineer. 150 Eventually, she was
involuntarily transferred to the position of Technical Engineer in
June of 1998. After her transfer, she was again paid at a lower rate
than similarly situated male Technical Engineers doing identical work
141 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003 WL
25507253 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003), rev'd, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005), affd, 550
U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
142 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court's 2006-2007 Term Employment Law
Cases: A Quiet but Revealing Term, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 219, 221 n.8 (2007)
(citing Editorial, As a Matter ofJustice Congress Should Correct Ruling on Fair Pay, DAtL.
MORNING NEws, June 5, 2007, at 14A; Editorial, Court Bias Deadline Too Tight, DENVER
POST, June 4, 2007, at B7; Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at
A18); see also, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices' Ruling Limits Lawsuits on Pay Disparity,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at Al (summarizing the Court's opinions and the case's
immediate effect).
143 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 5.
144 Complaint 5, Ledbetter, No. 99-C-3137-E, 1999 WL 34804272, at *1.
145 Id. 1 6.
146 Id. 1 10.
147 Id. 1 11.
148 Id. 35.
149 Id.
150 Id. 1 36.
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in the same establishment.1 5' Goodyear willfully and maliciously dis-
criminated against the plaintiff in pay because of her sex.152
Ms. Ledbetter performed work equal or substantially equal to
that of the male Area Managers, but received less pay for a substan-
tially similar job.1 53 Goodyear had a practice of offering overtime
work first to male Area Managers, then to Ms. Ledbetter only after
each male turned down the offer, even though she expressed interest
in working overtime. 154 In January of 1998, Ms. Ledbetter received a
discriminatory evaluation in which she received a low score, while
men performing the same job in the same manner as she received a
higher evaluation score. 155 Also, Ledbetter's male supervisors and
coworkers intentionally isolated her by excluding her.156 For exam-
ple, Jerry Jones, the Business Center Manager, regularly excluded
Ledbetter from division meetings that he conducted with only the
male Area Managers present.157
Ledbetter was involuntarily transferred from the position of Area
Manager to that of Technical Engineer on January 5, 1998.158 This
position removed her supervisory responsibilities. 159 This transfer
effectively prohibited the plaintiff from receiving more pay increases
and reduced her retirement income.' 60 She was the only one out of
sixteen Area Managers transferred out of that position. 161 After trans-
ferring Ms. Ledbetter out of the Area Manager position, the company
filled her position with a younger male named Steve Thompson, her
former co-worker. 162 Afterward, the company promoted a male in his
twenties into the Area Manager position vacated by Thompson.1 63
After her removal from the Area Manager position, there were no
female Area Managers. 164
Goodyear's act of forcing Ms. Ledbetter to transfer to the Techni-
cal Engineer job was clearly intended to cause her resignation, as the
Technical Engineer position required the plaintiff to do extensive
151 Id. 1 12.
152 Id. 1 13.
153 Id. 1 14.
154 Id. 1 15.
155 Id. 1 16.
156 Id. 1 17.
157 Id. 1 18.
158 Id. 1 37.
159 Id. 1 19.
160 Id. 1 20.
161 Id. 1 21.
162 Id. 1 32.
163 Id. 11 22, 32.
164 Id. 1 23.
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manual labor including lifting two hundred fifty tires weighing eighty
pounds off of one truck and onto another.165 She was the only
woman in that position, and despite the grueling physical barriers the
company threw in front of the plaintiff, Ms. Ledbetter did her job.166
She received no training for the Technical Engineer position, and
there was no job procedure manual or written job description availa-
ble to her.167 Ledbetter was suspended for three days for allegedly
making an error that similarly situated men made and were not sus-
pended.168 Significantly younger Area Managers received substan-
tially higher salaries than Ledbetter for substantially equal work.169
Goodyear further retaliated against Ms. Ledbetter by failing to
rehire her. She properly applied for an Area Manager position at
Goodyear on November 8, 1999.170 The Employment Specialist, Don
Gardner, told her that they were not rehiring for Area Manager posi-
tions.1 71 However, there were five Area Manager positions available
and at least one male Area Manager who retired was rehired. 172 As of
the date the complaint was filed, Goodyear had refused to rehire Ms.
Ledbetter. 173 Goodyear created an environment so hostile and abu-
sive that Ledbetter suffered depression requiring medical treat-
ment.174 Eventually, the terms and conditions of her Technical
Engineer job and the unwarranted discipline by the company forced
her into resignation against her will.
175
2. Applying the Iqbal Two-Prong Approach
What is immediately apparent in analyzing Ledbettds complaint is
that it provides many more factual details than the preceding two
cases. Most of the allegations are comprised of factual content that a
post-Iqbal court would have to view as true when subject to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Nevertheless, there are certain allegations that
would probably be filtered out as "legal conclusions." The barest of
the "bare allegations" simply states: "The defendant willfully and mali-
ciously discriminated against the plaintiff in pay because of her
165 Id. 1 24.
166 Id. 11 25-26.
167 Id. 1 27.
168 Id. 11 27-28.
169 Id. 1 33.
170 Id. 1 38.
171 Id.
172 Id. 39.
173 Id.
174 Id. 1 41.
175 Id. 1 42.
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sex."176 Because it is wholly conclusory, a correct application of Iqbal
would disregard this allegation entirely.
Another suspect allegation states: "The defendant willfully dis-
criminated against the plaintiff because of her age by transferring her
to the position of Technical Engineer." 177 Whether Goodyear "will-
fully discriminated" against Ledbetter or not is precisely the issue that
is being litigated. The fact that she was transferred to a technical engi-
neer position is not an example of res ipsa loquitur. This allegation is
roughly equivalent to the allegation in Twombly that the phone com-
panies "entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete with one
another."178 Both are allegations that attempt to explain a known and
undesirable activity with a legally conclusory motive that imputes lia-
bility against the defendant. Despite the presence of additional fac-
tual allegations consistent with this claim, they cannot immunize a
legally conclusory allegation from Iqbats first prong.
Other suspect allegations are more difficult to gauge. One in
particular states that Ledbetter "received a discriminatory evaluation
in which she received a low score while men performing the same job
in the same manner as she received a higher evaluation score." 179
This one includes more factual content, including the month and
year of occurrence. It asserts a discriminatory evaluation, but also
includes a basis for making that determination. The problem is that
the facts used to support the claim, that "men performing the same
job and in the same manner" received higher scores, are not very spe-
cific. In fact, these are among the factors used in some Title VII cases
to determine whether an employee is "directly comparable" to
another for the purposes of employment discrimination.18 0 A judge
with an eye towards the prima facie requirements of a Title VII claim
may view allegations such as this one as "a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.''8 This is essentially the same rationale the Iqbal
Court used when explaining the two-prong approach in Twombly.
176 Id. 13.
177 Id. 31.
178 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 551 (2007) (quoting Com-
plaint 51, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126)).
179 Complaint, supra note 144, 1 16, 1999 WL 34804272, at *1.
180 See, e.g., Dear v. Shinseki, 578 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2009) (defining factors to
determine a "similarly situated employee . . . including whether the employee (1)
held the same job description; (2) was subject to the same standards, (3) was subordinate to
the same supervisor; and (4) had comparable experience, education, and other quali-
fications" (emphasis added)).
181 See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
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Because the plaintiff "flatly pleaded" the exact requirements needed
to satisfy a § 1 Sherman Act claim, it was viewed as too conclusory and
it fell victim to the first prong.18 2 If a judge feels that the allegation
mirrors the required claim elements too closely, an otherwise valid
allegation such as this one may be unfairly hit with the "legal conclu-
sion" label and summarily disregarded in the first prong.
This issue, along with the difficulty in conclusively determining
an opposing party's state-of-mind, makes any allegation that imputes
intent particularly difficult to judge. 183 The allegation that claims "a
clear intent to cause her resignation" by describing the physically rig-
orous work of a technical engineer falls into this trap as well.' 8 4 It may
not be enough to compel a judge to filter out this comparatively fact-
filled allegation,18 5 but the intent element makes it more ambiguous
than an equivalent allegation that does not impute intent.
No matter how many of the above allegations are stamped with
the legal conclusion label, and thus, disregarded for the second
prong's plausibility test, Ledbetter still has a better chance of surviving a
12(b) (6) motion than either Swierkiewicz or Leatherman. The com-
plaint has relatively few allegations that serve as pure legal conclu-
sions. The rest are sufficiently intertwined with detailed factual
allegations that it may be problematic to dismiss them entirely. So far,
the allegations in Ledbetter may give rise to a plausible allegation of
discrimination.
Its biggest weakness, and one that may be exploited by a savvy
opponent that will surely invoke Iqbal, is that many of its claims
depend on the inference that Goodyear was a sexually discriminatory
environment. Lilly Ledbetter was the only female manager through-
out her years of employment, and this fact is alleged multiple times in
her complaint. There are no facts that show that other women
applied to those male-dominated positions, only to be rejected in
favor of men. Hypothetically, Goodyear can assert in its answer that
women never applied for those male-dominated jobs, thus suggesting
that Goodyear did not discriminate against female applicants.
Because Goodyear possesses all of the relevant information, it
may also include in the pleadings any favorable facts suggesting that
182 See id.
183 See Bone, supra note 82, at 873 ("[F]acts that are difficult to verify objectively
fare much worse in a thick screening model. Two notable examples are the types of
factual allegations at issue in Iqbal and Twombly. descriptions of the defendant's state
of mind.. ").
184 See Complaint, supra note 144, 24, 1999 WL 34804272, at *1.
185 This is yet another example of a "compound allegation." See infra Part IV.
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Ledbetter was a substandard employee. 186 The fact that Ms. Ledbetter
was the only female manager then becomes a nonfactor. Any alleged
unfair treatment of Ledbetter can then be attributed to the more typi-
cal business judgment reasons having nothing to do with gender.
Even with the rule that a plaintiff's allegations should be taken as true,
the defendant's ability to respond via the pleadings will inevitably
influence a court's judgment as to whether the plaintiff alleges a plau-
sible claim. This has the potential effect of turning 12 (b) (6) motions
into "pre-summary judgment" motions, making it even more difficult
for plaintiffs to prevail.' 8 7 It seems that given enough rationalizations,
even the relatively strong claims in Ledbetter can eventually be whittled
down to resemble the likes of Swierkiewicz, Leatherman, Twombly, or
Iqbal.
IV. USING "COMPOUND ALLEGATIONS" TO CIRCUMVENT
IQBAL'S FIRST PRONG
If judges adhere to the text of Iqbal, they will have more discre-
tion than ever when granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Aside from
their ability to determine the overall plausibility of a claim, they also
now have discretion over whether certain allegations are bare asser-
tions or legal conclusions to be filtered out before applying Iqbals
second prong plausibility analysis. A judge with a tendency for dis-
missing certain types of claims now has the ability to carve out particu-
lar allegations from a complaint, further ensuring that the claim as a
whole fails the plausibility test. This is not to suggest that all judges
186 Examples include negative job evaluations, low standardized test scores, or
below-average objective measurements (e.g., attendance records or productivity
metrics).
187 See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summaiy Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 65-66, 98 (2007). This
problem is further magnified in cases with significant information asymmetry between
the two parties. Defendants essentially have a chance to dispose of a case A la Rule 56,
without needing to give the plaintiff equal access to pertinent information via pretrial
discovery. See also Access to Justice Denied, supra note 119, at 15 (statement of Arthur R.
Miller, University Professor, New York University School of Law) ("The common law
demurrer, the code motion to dismiss, and our prior understanding of Rule 12(b)(6)
all focused only on the complaint's legal sufficiency, not on a judicial assessment of
the case's facts or actual merits. Now, Twombly and Iqbal may have transformed the
well-understood purpose of the motion to dismiss into a potentially Draconian
method of foreclosing access based solely on an evaluation of the challenged plead-
ing's factual presentation .... The transmogrification of this threshold procedure has
pushed the motion to dismiss far from its historical function and, in my view, beyond
its permissible scope of inquiry.").
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would treat these claims equally, but the mechanism is in place for
judges looking for an easier way to dismiss plaintiff claims.
One of Iqba's ambiguities may prove useful to plaintiffs trying to
overcome this tougher pleading standard. When a single allegation
contains both factual assertions and legal conclusions, which of these
should be considered (or ignored) when applying the first prong? In
Iqbal, the allegations were drafted so that each disregarded "legal con-
clusion" was self-contained in its own distinct paragraph.188 The com-
plaint was segmented enough so that the Court was able to identify
allegations "wholly factual" or "wholly conclusory," and filter out the
latter ones. How then should courts handle longer "compound alle-
gations" that mix relevant factual material with legal conclusions?
Iqbal does not neatly answer this question. On the one hand, the
first prong was fashioned to filter out "bare assertions." It is possible
that, so long as an allegation contains factual content to accompany
the legal conclusion, this should qualify it for the second prong of
analysis. On the other hand, if the factual information is only tenu-
ously connected to the legal conclusion asserted, how then should the
allegation as a whole be treated? If the compound allegation is
included in its entirety, then the embedded legal conclusion must be
taken as true. If a court rejects it as "conclusory," does the embedded
factual information also get disregarded? The Iqbal Court only
filtered out entire allegations, not portions of them.
Not only does neither interpretation fit squarely into Iqba's hold-
ing, each carries significant drawbacks. Allowing courts to filter out
conclusory elements within individual allegations would grant courts
even more power to prefilter pleadings to their satisfaction. Not
allowing courts to do so would invite plaintiffs to more carefully craft
their pleadings to surround allegations containing favorable legal con-
clusions with significant factual assertions, even if they are tenuously
related. 189 This kind of pleading tomfoolery is exactly what the Fed-
eral Rules were meant to do away with, but plaintiffs may find it neces-
sary to engage in this classic dog-and-pony show to preserve their
pleadings from Iqba's first prong.
188 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
189 There is already evidence that the Eighth Circuit is applying the latter interpre-
tation. See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) ("First,
the court must take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. This tenet does not
apply, however, to legal conclusions or 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action'; such allegations may properly be set aside." (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009))).
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CONCLUSION
Thousands of cases have already been affected by the introduc-
tion of Iqbals two-pronged approach to determine the sufficiency of a
complaint. Though this Note focused mostly on discrimination
claims, Iqbal (as with Twombly before it) has been cited in cases
encompassing several areas of substantive law.190 If the pleading stan-
dard is not changed via precedent or an official amendment to the
Federal Rules, it may continue to affect the substantive law in ways we
have not seen since the adoption of the Federal Rules. The use of
compound allegations may be a possible work-around to help plain-
tiffs withstand a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, but any rule that emphasizes
form over substance is one we should probably avoid entirely.
190 See, e.g., Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009)
(alleging consumer confusion regarding trademark and fair use); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (alleging Alien Tort Statute and Tor-
ture Victims Protection Act claims); Farash v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 337 F. App'x 7, 8
(2d Cir. 2009) (alleging negligence and assault claims under New York law).
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